Following a string of high profile trading losses, greater attention has recently been focused on the trading risk faced by commercial banks. Following the 1996 Market Risk Amendment to the Basel Accord (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1996), the US and many other international bank regulatory agencies have set capital requirements to include a market risk charge that reflects the risk of banks' trading activities. The amount of capital required is a direct function of the bank's Value-at-Risk (hereafter VaR) from trading activities. VaR is defined as the p-th lower tail percentile of trading revenue over the next h periods R t,t+h , formally p = Pr(R t,t+h < VaR t+h|t ), and has become a standard market risk measure (Jorion, 2006 and non-inclusion of trading fees) and a histogram or plot of daily trading revenues, and (6) backtesting (the number of exceptions, i.e., days when actual loss is greater than VaR, and explanations of these exceptions). Over the period 1996-2005, we find large differences in the level of disclosure across US banks and an overall upward trend in the quantity of information released to the public. We also show that, over this ten-year sample period, disclosures at US banks are considerably lower than disclosures at Canadian banks. Moreover, we compute the value of our disclosure index in 2005 for a sample of 60 US and international banks. This cross-sectional analysis of the largest banks in the world indicates that US disclosures are below the average, although some banks, such as Bank of America and Wachovia, score very high on our 15-point disclosure scale. Furthermore, we uncover some drastic differences in disclosure across regions: from an overall satisfactory disclosure in Europe and Canada to absolutely no
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Following a string of high profile trading losses, greater attention has recently been focused on the trading risk faced by commercial banks. Following the 1996 Market Risk Amendment to the Basel Accord (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1996) , the US and many other international bank regulatory agencies have set capital requirements to include a market risk charge that reflects the risk of banks' trading activities. The amount of capital required is a direct function of the bank's Value-at-Risk (hereafter VaR) from trading activities. VaR is defined as the p-th lower tail percentile of trading revenue over the next h periods R t,t+h , formally p = Pr(R t,t+h < VaR t+h|t ), and has become a standard market risk measure (Jorion, 2006) .
In the U.S., market risk disclosures are required under Financial Reporting Release Number 48 (hereafter FRR 48) published by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (1997) . VaR disclosure is, along with tabular presentation and sensitivity analysis, one the three reporting methods described in FRR 48 (Linsmeier and Pearson, 1997) . 1 A not so well-known consequence of this multi-format disclosure environment is that VaR disclosures are not mandatory for all 10-K filings as long as an alternative quantitative disclosure format is used. In practice, the level of disclosure about trading 1 Tabular presentation consists of a table of financial instruments (grouped by market risk category and market characteristics) that discloses the fair value of the assets and its future cash-flows. Sensitivity analysis presents the effect on earnings, cash-flows, or fair values of a hypothetical shock on a key risk factor, e.g., a 50 basis-point increase in the short-term interest rate (see Blankley, Lamb and Schroeder, 2000 for an illustration).
Furthermore, we find that Historical Simulation is the most popular VaR method in the world, as 73 percent of banks that disclose their VaR method report using Historical
Simulation. This is a non-parametric method based on the unconditional distribution of the risk factors. We show that a direct implication of the current popularity of historical simulation is that 1-day VaR is likely to be disconnected from the next day volatility.
Our second objective is to assess the accuracy of the disclosed VaR figures. Specifically, we study whether actual daily VaRs contain information about the volatility of subsequent trading revenues. To motivate this test recall that VaR is defined as the lower tail percentile of trading revenue and, as a result, will increase with the conditional volatility. In fact, we show theoretically that VaR is linearly related to the conditional standard deviation of trading revenue. In our empirical tests, we use daily data on VaR and trading revenue extracted from publicly available graphs presented in annual reports using a novel data extraction method. We compare the forecasting ability of two volatility measures: the VaR computed by the bank and a forecast from a simple econometric GARCH model. To compare these two competing estimates, we employ different econometric approaches: (1) an augmented in-sample GARCH model that includes the VaR measure as an additional variable driving the conditional volatility of trading revenues, and (2) an out-of-sample regression of actual volatility on one or both contending volatility measures. Overall, our empirical tests show that VaR based on Historical Simulation helps little in forecasting future volatility. In addition, its incremental forecasting ability over a simple GARCH model is often negligible. This finding is consistent with our claim that Historical-Simulation VaRs are disconnected from future volatility.
VaRs and trading revenues, and we estimate a GARCH model as a benchmark against which to compare the VaR forecasts. Furthermore, in our sample period, most banks use Historical Simulation to compute their VaR.
We claim that the level and the quality of VaR public disclosure should not be studied in isolation. Previous research typically focuses either on the "quantity aspect" of VaR disclosures (e.g. Roulstone, 1999 , and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's 1999 or the "quality aspect" of VaR disclosures (e.g. Pérignon, Deng and Wang, 2006), but not on both simultaneously. 4 However, as the primary purpose of financial reporting is decision usefulness (FASB, 1980) , it is very important to check whether the quantity of information and the accuracy of this information are both at acceptable levels.
Furthermore, meaningful disclosure, as part of market discipline, is one of the three essential foundations or pillars of Basel II. Even a strict compliance to the most stringent disclosure requirement will be of little help in reducing information asymmetry on the market if the disclosed information is measured with error or biased. As Hoppe (1998, page 50) puts it, "believing a spuriously precise estimate of risk is worse than admitting the irreducible unreliability of one's estimate. False certainty is more dangerous than acknowledged ignorance".
Studying empirically the accuracy of disclosed VaR figures based on proprietary models
is also important in regard to the debate on banks' capital requirements. Under the Market Risk Amendment to the Basel Accord (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1996 and Hendricks and Hirtle, 1997), the capital charge for market risk is based on the output of a bank's internal VaR model rather than on an externally imposed supervisory measure. Many market commentators have indicated that the high degree of autonomy granted to commercial banks in setting capital charges might have some perverse effects.
In particular, banks may be inclined to underestimate their VaR in order to reduce their market risk charge (Lucas, 2001) or to decrease the quality of its risk management system (Daníelsson, Jorgensen and de Vries, 2002) . Conversely, in their theoretical analysis of
VaR-based capital requirements, Cuoco and Liu (2006) conclude that VaR-based capital requirements can be very effective in inducing truthful revelation of market risk. While many (conflicting) theoretical models of the accuracy of VaR are available in the literature, very little is known on the actual accuracy of disclosed VaRs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we study the level of VaR disclosure at commercial banks in the U.S. and in the rest of the world. Specifically, we define our Value-at-Risk disclosure index and we study its level through time and across banks and countries. Section II presents our empirical analysis of the relationship between VaR and the volatility of future daily trading revenues. We summarize and conclude our study in Section III.
I. Level of VaR Disclosure
In the U.S. and many other countries, commercial banks are required to provide quantitative information about their trading risks. We undertake an empirical analysis of the actual public disclosure about VaR made by banks to its investors, creditors, and counterparties through financial statements.
A. VaR Disclosure Index
To facilitate the empirical analysis we construct a disclosure index, For most banks, there is a perfect overlap between the two documents as far as market risk and VaR are concerned. However, 10-K forms sometimes directly refer to annual reports for market risk disclosure. In the following, we do not make any distinction between information disclosed in 10-K forms and in annual reports. seven points (out of fifteen). We also report a severe discrepancy across banks in terms of disclosure, which is suggested by the large standard-deviation of the VaRDI and the 10-point range between minimum and maximum VaRDIs. Furthermore, the heterogeneity in the level of disclosure remains pervasive during the entire sample period.
In Figure 1 , we take a disaggregated look at VaR disclosure by plotting the VaRDI timeseries of each sample bank. A simple perusal of the ten panels in this figure allows us to identify some interesting differences across banks. Firstly, the four largest banks display superior market risk disclosure. In particular, top- (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2001) . The higher industry concentration in Canada creates greater incentive for not deviating from the norm, which turns out to be high market risk disclosure.
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C. VaR Disclosure in the World
How does the level of VaR disclosure in the U.S. and Canada compare with other regulatory jurisdictions? To answer this question we collect data on VaR disclosure from the 2005 annual reports for the fifty largest international banks measured by total assets. 9 The six Canadian banks are Bank of Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia or Scotiabank, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, National Bank of Canada, Royal Bank of Canada, and Toronto-Dominion Bank. Bank size is defined as total assets at the end of the year 2005 as disclosed in banks' annual reports. The term "Big Six" is frequently used to refer to the six biggest banks that dominate the banking industry in Canada. 10 The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI), the financial regulatory body in Canada, made compulsory VaR calculations in 1997, but not VaR public disclosures. 11 Another implication of the high concentration of the Canadian banking industry is that all banks are likely to be very cautious when estimating their VaR. Consistent with this assertion, Pérignon, Deng and Wang (2006) show that the six largest Canadian commercial banks strongly overstate their VaR, which leads in some cases to market risk charges that are five times larger than what would be required with unbiased VaR estimates.
The source for the international banks' assets is Bankersalmanac.com, which itself takes the data from the banks' annual reports. We complement this cross-section with our 16 US and Canadian banks for which we have data over a longer sample period. Since some of the banks included in the world Top 50 are incorporated in the U.S. or in Canada, we end up with 60 banks. Table II presents can be identified in Figure 3 . Firstly, consistent with the evidence in the U.S., there is considerable cross-sectional variation in the disclosure of large international banks.
Secondly, the level of disclosure is higher for banks ranked in the first half of the sample (average VaRDI of 9.1 for Top 25 banks) than for smaller banks (average VaRDI of 6.5
for banks ranked between 26 th and 50 th ). According to a two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances, these two means are statistically different at the 5% confidence level.
Thirdly, average disclosure at US banks is slightly lower than the average disclosure at international banks, i.e., average VaRDI of 7.0 for large US banks and 7.8 for large international banks, and as already noted, much lower than in Canada (average VaRDI of 12.0 for Canadian banks).
In order to investigate further the differences in VaR disclosure across countries, we present in Table III 
D. VaR Estimation Methods
There are many different methodologies available to compute VaR and under the internal model's approach banks are afforded significant latitude. In Figure 4 we summarize the This method is a flexible, non-parametric technique that forecasts future potential price changes using actual shocks on state variables that occurred in the past (Christoffersen, 2003, pages 100-103, and Jorion, 2006, pages 262-265 The current popularity of Historical Simulation is due to two main reasons. First, the size and complexity of the trading positions at commercial banks make parametric VaR methods hard to implement in practice. As many banks report to be dealing with thousands of risk factors, they choose not to attempt to estimate time-varying volatilities and covariances for risk factors (Andersen, Bollerslev, Christoffersen and Diebold, 2007 
II. Quality of VaR Disclosure
In this section we conduct an empirical analysis of the quality of reported VaR estimates.
We assess the quality using daily VaR measures from five of the largest commercial banks in the world. We define 'VaR quality' as the ability for a VaR to forecast the volatility of trading revenues.
A. Data and Backtesting
For our empirical analysis of the quality of VaR disclosures we employ a sample of five banks, all of which scored the highest on the disclosure index (all have VaRDIs of at least 13). For each country included in the survey presented in Section I, we look for a bank disclosing a graph of the daily VaRs and trading revenues over a sufficiently long sample period (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) whose data can be extracted as we describe below. We start with the largest bank and if this does not include a graph of daily VaRs and trading revenues we then consider the second and then third largest banks. Using this procedure we obtain a sample of five commercial banks from five different countries. In the U.S., we use the largest bank, Bank of America, since it discloses the necessary information over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . In Germany and in Canada, we also select the largest bank (i.e.,
Deutsche Bank and Royal Bank of Canada, respectively) and pick the second largest bank in Switzerland (Credit Suisse First Boston, hereafter CSFB) and the third largest in France (Société Générale). None of the other countries have any banks meeting our data requirements. One may be concerned about how representative our sample is. We note that including a plot of VaR and trading revenue is voluntary and we focus on only the largest banks which presumably devote the most resources to computing VaR.
Consequently, our results are tilted towards finding that disclosed VaR is useful.
However, to pre-empt our results, we find that VaRs disclosed by most of these banks are not very helpful to forecast variability of future trading revenues.
Trading revenues are not identically defined across our five sample banks. Ideally, disclosed trading revenues should be hypothetical revenues based on previous day portfolio allocation. This is the type of data disclosed by Royal Bank of Canada only.
Conversely, Bank of America, CSFB, Deutsche Bank, and Société Générale report actual revenues that are affected by intraday trades made by the bank. Furthermore, none of our sample banks explicitly state that their trading revenues are not inflated by trading fees or commissions, which may create some distortions in backtesting.
For the five sample banks, we upload the VaR graph from the annual report for the years 2001-2004 in our data extraction application and retrieve the underlying time series. 13 We present the graphs of the daily trading revenues and one day-ahead 99% VaRs in Figure   5 . We observe that there are relatively few exceptions or days when the actual loss is greater than the VaR. 14 This preliminary analysis suggests that there is at best a weak relationship between VaR and subsequent trading volatility.
We present in Table IV We begin the empirical analysis by formally testing the null hypothesis that the proportion of exceptions equals one percent using the banks' VaRs. We implement the Likelihood Ratio test of Kupiec (1995) known as the unconditional coverage test:
where p = 0.01 is the target exception rate, p is the sample proportion of exceptions, X is the total number of exceptions, T is the total number of observations, and LR is asymptotically distributed chi-square with one degree of freedom. 16 The results are reported in Panel C of 
The VaR for portfolio y is defined by:
Equating Equations (2) and (3) , from which we obtain:
One special case is of particular interest. If x is a standardized random variable (i.e., zero mean and unit standard deviation) and
, σ > 0 (i.e., a member of the location-scale family of distributions), then:
is any probability density function, then the family of probability density functions g(x|μ,σ)= 1 / σ × f((x-μ) / σ) is a location-scale family with standard probability density function f(x) and is indexed by the location (μ) and scale (σ > 0) parameters. The normal distribution is a member in which f(x) is the standard
Holding the conditional mean constant, this suggests that the VaR is larger during periods of high volatility, and the relationship between VaR and standard deviation is linear. This result extends a similar result in Jorion (2002a) who assumes a symmetric conditional distribution with time-varying heteroscedasticity:
where p Z denotes the p-th percentile of the symmetrically distributed random variable Z.
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To provide a benchmark against which bank VaR disclosures can be evaluated, we estimate a simple GARCH model and then an augmented GARCH model, denoted X-GARCH, which includes VaR as a determinant of the conditional variance of trading revenues (Brenner, Harjes and Kroner, 1996 and Donaldson and Kamstra, 2005) :
It is important to note the different information sets used to compute the two volatility measures. When computing VaR the risk-management departments have access to far normal probability density function, and the location and scale parameters are respectively the mean and standard deviation, though the location and scale parameters are not always the mean and standard deviation. The family is quite broad and includes many asymmetric distributions. 18 The link between conditional standard deviation and VaR holds even when portfolio returns are asymmetric as long as the conditional distribution falls in the location-scale family of distributions. For example, the relationship holds when there is skewness but the standardized skewness is constant (though the conditional third central moment can vary through time as volatility changes). In our parametric empirical tests we use the fat-tailed T distribution to account for leptokurtosis. 19 There is a possible identification problem that could arise if the banks compute VaR using a GARCH model based on historical actual trading revenues (i.e., using a restricted version of Equation (7) setting γ = 0). In this case we could not separately identify γ and the GARCH parameters because of perfect collinearity. However, we know that none of our sample banks compute VaR using parametric GARCH models. The model is identified under the joint null hypothesis that γ = 0 and bank VaR is imperfectly correlated with h t+1|t and when the GARCH model is miss-specified (i.e., 0 =
= β α
). Incidentally, we find quite low correlation between bank VaR and GARCH-based fitted volatility.
more information than what is available to the econometrician. In particular, the bank VaR figure is computed using pseudo-historical portfolio returns, i.e., historical asset returns with the current portfolio weights. On the other hand the econometrician does not have access to current portfolio weights when computing VaR using the GARCH model. The GARCH model is estimated using historical portfolio returns and pseudo-returns which are in turn based on historical and not current portfolio weights. This is a key difference since portfolios vary dramatically from one day to the next. We begin our analysis by restricting the γ parameter in Equation (7) to be zero and estimating the standard GARCH model. We report the parameter estimates and standard errors for this model for all five banks in Table V 
C. Out-of-Sample Test
We also evaluate the performance of VaR and GARCH forecasts using the MincerZarnowitz (1969) regression:
where R t+1 is the trading revenue on day t+1, and VaR t+1|t is the step-ahead VaR estimate made on day t for day t+1 trading revenue. It is important to note that different distributions will generate different values for p Z in Equation (6) but the regression coefficient b will automatically adjust for these differences.
To provide a benchmark against which the VaR volatility forecasts can be evaluated, we consider a simple GARCH model for daily trading revenues: 
Note that if the GARCH model is true, then c will equal unity, while if the VaR model is the correct one b will be positive, but without knowing the true conditional distribution we cannot pin down a specific value for b.
We report the variance forecasting regression coefficients and R 2 in Table VI we compare it to the out-of-sample forecasts from GARCH models (Bollerslev, 1986 21 We use the first year's data (2001) to estimate a GARCH model and use the parameter estimates to forecast volatility for the subsequent day's trading revenue. We then expand the sample using that observation, re-estimate the GARCH model parameters using this slightly larger sample, and forecast the next day's trading revenue variance. When we only use the step-ahead conditional volatility forecast from the GARCH model we find a positive relationship for all banks (though not significant for Deutsche Bank) except Société Générale which is negative and statistically insignificant. To interpret the puzzling result for Société Générale recall that the estimate of α was very small and not statistically different from zero so its poor performance out-of-sample is not surprising.
of-sample test is, unlike the GARCH estimate, 1-day VaR does not forecast trading revenue volatility.
III. Conclusion
In most countries, commercial banks are required to publicly disclose quantitative information about their trading risks with VaR being the most popular. In the first part of this paper, we study actual VaR disclosures both in the U.S. and internationally. Over the period 1996-2005, we find some large differences in the level of disclosure across US banks and a general upward trend in the quantity of information released to the public.
Our cross-sectional analysis of 60 international banks indicates that US disclosures are below the average and we uncover some drastic differences in disclosure across regions:
from an overall satisfactory disclosure in Europe and Canada to absolutely no VaR disclosure in China. We also find that Historical Simulation is by far the most popular
VaR methodology used by commercial banks. We postulate that the current popularity of Historical Simulation among banks leads to a disconnection between 1-day VaR and actual future volatility.
In the second part of the paper, we empirically test whether actual daily VaRs contain information about the volatility of subsequent trading revenues. ν degrees of freedom. The γ coefficient is fixed to zero in the GARCH specification and it is estimated as a free parameter in the augmented GARCH (X-GARCH) specification. * (**) denotes a coefficient estimate significant at the 5% (1%) confidence level. Table 2 for details). Societé Générale
The Bank of America
[6] Zoom in and click on each data point. By doing so, we capture the twodimensional coordinates of each data point.
where n is the number of data points to be extracted. Then, sequentially click on the data points. The 2-D coordinates are automatically stored into the (n × 2) data matrix.
[7] Convert the MATLAB vertical coordinates (second column of the data matrix) into graph coordinates. For each data point, compute (zero coordinate value -point coordinate value) / s.
As a refinement, we can plot the extracted data in EXCEL and superimpose the graph of the extracted data with the original graph. This can be done by right clicking on the graph of the extracted data and Format Chart Area / Area: none and Format Plot Area / Area:
none. If necessary, we can manually adjust the extracted series until reaching a perfect match between the two lines.
We first gauge the accuracy of our data extraction method using real data for which exact numeric values are readily available in standard databases. Specifically, we use daily, weekly, and monthly data on the S&P composite index returns for the year 2005. The use of different frequencies allows us to investigate how the extraction method performs when the dataset grows large (from 12 monthly observations to 252 daily observations).
We consider different types of graphs, i.e., lines, lines with markers, and bars. The experiment protocol is as follows. We sequentially provide our research assistant with a pdf file containing graphs based on line, line plus markets, and bars (see Figure A1 ).
After our research assistant had extracted the data from the line graph, we gave him a pdf file containing the line with markers, and after receiving the data we submitted the pdf file for the bars. In the first part of the experiment the research assistant applies the first seven steps of the algorithm. The research assistant is given no information about the data. In particular, he does not know the number of data points in each graph or the initial and terminal value of the time-series. Note that in real applications, the final value (e.g. year end) of the series is often known.
We present the results in Panel A of Table AI . For each graph, we report the time required to extract the data, the extraction error (measured by the mean absolute error / mean absolute return), and the error variance ratio (variance of the error / variance of the true return). We reach several conclusions. Firstly, the necessary time to extract data from a simple line is longer than with other types of graphs. When the sample size is increased twenty-one times (from 12 to 252 observations), the extraction time is increased by a factor of six or nine depending on the type of graph. Secondly, regardless of the type of graph and the sample size, our data extraction algorithm leads systematically to the exact number of data points. Thirdly, the accuracy slightly deteriorates with sample size. The extraction error remains below 1% for marker-based and bar graphs, and is in excess of 2% for a line-based graph based on one year of daily data. The ratio of the variance of the extraction error and the variance of the true data is remarkably small. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that these accuracy figures are based on the first seven steps of the data extraction algorithm only, and that accuracy can be improved using the final refinement step. After superimposing the original graph and the graph of the extracted data, and slightly adjusting the extracted data, the extraction error for the 252 data-point line graph drops to 1.12%.
We simulate a second data set that consists of hypothetical trading revenues and VaRs.
We generate the two artificial time series using the following GARCH process. Figure A1 ). For each graph, we report the elapsed extraction time, the extraction error (mean absolute error / mean absolute return), and the error variance ratio (variance of the error / variance of the true return). In Panels B and C, we repeat the same analysis using artificial daily trading revenues and Value-at-Risk (see Figure A2 ). 
